AATL is a trust list inside Adobe Reader, not a legal standard. Here is what it does, what it does not do, and why most agreements never need it.

People ask whether an e-signature is "AATL" as though it were a grade, and the question behind it is usually a different one: will this hold up? Those are not the same question, and conflating them costs people money in both directions — some buy a certificate they will never need, and some assume a certificate is what makes an agreement enforceable.
The Adobe Approved Trust List is a list of certificate authorities that Adobe ships inside Acrobat and Reader. If a PDF is signed with a certificate from one of those authorities, Adobe draws a blue bar at the top saying the signature is valid, and does it without the reader configuring anything.
That is the whole of it. It is a distribution mechanism for trust in one company's PDF reader. It is not a law, not a standard body, and not a statement by anybody about whether an agreement is enforceable.
There is a European analogue, the EU Trusted Lists, which underpins qualified electronic signatures under eIDAS. That one is attached to law: under eIDAS a qualified signature has a specific legal status in the EU. AATL does not have an American equivalent of that status, because American law took a different route entirely.
The E-SIGN Act (federal, 2000) and the UETA (adopted in nearly every state) both take the same position: a signature is not denied legal effect merely because it is electronic. Neither of them specifies a technology. There is no list of approved algorithms, no accredited authority, and no certificate requirement anywhere in either statute.
What they ask for instead is about the circumstances of the signing:
Every one of those is a fact about what happened, not a property of a cryptographic object. Which is why a well-evidenced signature taken on a phone can be far more defensible than a certificate-signed PDF with no record of who was at the keyboard.
It matters when a specific counterparty requires it, and that is the honest answer. The cases we see:
Notice what those have in common: in each, a machine or a policy is doing the checking, not a court. AATL solves the machine-checking problem. It does not solve the "prove she signed it" problem, and the machine-checking problem is the rarer of the two for most businesses.
A certificate says a private key signed these bytes and that the key belongs to whoever the authority issued it to. It says nothing about:
That last one is the gap most people are surprised by, and it is where disputes actually live.
Ask the counterparty. If nobody is asking for AATL, you are choosing between "a document that validates in Adobe" and "a document you can defend", and the second is what a dispute turns on. If somebody is asking, get it — and understand you are satisfying their process, not improving your evidence.
You can also have both, and for high-value agreements that is the right answer. They are independent properties of the same document.
SignSealer is not a law firm and this is not legal advice. What is enforceable where you are is a question for your own counsel.